@inproceedings{ashebo_resilience_2027,
title={{Analyzing the Cyber Resilience of Distribution Systems with Vulnerable
Inverter-Based Resources}},
author={Ashebo, Betelihem Kebede and Raymaker, Anna and Talkington, Samuel and Asiamah,
Richard and Chhotaray, Animesh and Zonouz, Saman and Molzahn, Daniel K.},
booktitle={60th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS)},
year={2027},
month={1}
}
The proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs), particularly solar photovoltaic (PV) systems, introduces new operational and security challenges for distribution networks. This paper presents a cyber-physical attack framework in which an adversary manipulates selected inverters to disrupt grid operations. To identify worst-case attacks, we formulate optimization problems that maximize steady-state voltage violations. The set of compromised inverters in these problems is constrained by an attack budget that is informed by vulnerabilities identified via our associated screening of Internet-connected inverters. The worst-case attack problems are formulated as Mixed-Integer Linear Programs (MILPs) that use the linearized DistFlow equations to model the impact of the attack on unbalanced three-phase distribution systems. The attack solutions obtained from the LinDist3Flow formulation are validated using AC power flow (ACPF) simulations with fixed attacked inverter setpoints. Numerical experiments on modified IEEE 13-bus, 34-bus, and 123-bus distribution test cases demonstrate that compromising between 10% and 25% of strategically selected inverters can induce voltage violations across multiple buses.
Anna Raymaker, Samuel Talkington, Zeezoo Ryu, Richard Asiamah, Emad Abukhousa, Betelihem Ashebo, Animesh Chhotaray, Daniel K. Molzahn, Frank Li, Saman Zonouz, and Raheem Beyah
Samuel Talkington, Cameron Khanpour, Rahul K. Gupta, Sergio A. Dorado-Rojas, Daniel Turizo, Hyeongon Park, Dmitrii M. Ostrovskii, and Daniel K. Molzahn